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People are notoriously poor at detecting the deception of 
strangers (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Whether this ability 
improves within the context of close relationships is less 
clear. Although we might expect that accuracy would be 
higher between people who know each other well, surpris-
ingly there is no unqualified support for the notion that 
friends or romantic partners detect each other’s lies better 
than strangers can (Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1999; 
Ickes & Simpson, 1997; McCornack & Levine, 1990; 
McCornack & Parks, 1986; Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004).
Why Friends Might Not Be Superior to 
Strangers at Detecting Deception
Ironically, knowing someone well may actually impair our 
deception detection ability by imparting a false sense of con-
fidence in the ability to read that particular person. 
McCornack and Parks (1986) theorized that being in a close 
relationship leads to increased truth bias (the tendency to 
judge most communications as truthful), which in turn leads 
to diminished deception detection accuracy. Although this 
theory has not been tested in friendships, it was supported in 
a study of romantic couples in which increased confidence in 
one’s ability to “read” one’s relationship partner led to greater 
truth bias and lower deception detection accuracy (Levine & 
McCornack, 1992).
Perhaps one of the most important obstacles to detecting the 
lies of friends is that those are exactly the types of lies people 
most want to believe. While people typically tell strangers self-
centered lies to make themselves look good, 44% of lies told to 
friends are altruistic lies told to protect them from negative feel-
ings or make them feel good. Another 19% of lies told to friends 
are told to avoid conflict and maintain the friendship (DePaulo 
& Kashy, 1998). These are the types of lies that are in people’s 
best interest and in the best interest of their friendship to accept 
as true. Murray and colleagues (Murray & Holmes, 1999; 
Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996) have shown that positive illu-
sions can contribute to stability and satisfaction in romantic 
relationships and it is likely that the same is true of friendships.
Ickes and Simpson (1997) developed a model to pre-
dict when close relationship partners should be motivated 
(consciously or unconsciously) not to read each other’s 
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affective states accurately. They theorized that motivated 
inaccuracy is most prone to occur when the perceiver’s 
close relationship partner experiences thoughts and feel-
ings that are threatening to the perceiver or to the rela-
tionship, and when the partner’s verbal and nonverbal 
cues are ambiguous. In this model, the main cause of 
motivated inaccuracy is the perceiver’s own feelings. In a 
study by Anderson (1999), people attempted to detect 
deception when their romantic partner and a stranger 
stated honestly or deceptively that they found another 
person attractive. Romantic partners were less accurate 
than strangers and had a stronger truth bias, particularly 
when the hidden truth was threatening to their relation-
ships—that is, when their partners pretended that they did 
not find someone else attractive.
An alternative possibility is that threatening cues become 
ambiguous to a close relationship partner precisely because 
the person expressing those cues wants them to be. In one of 
the earliest studies on motivated inaccuracy, Rosenthal and 
DePaulo (1979) showed that women are more likely than men 
to perform poorly at interpreting nonverbal cues that senders 
are trying to hide. They theorized that perceivers who read 
cues that senders deliberately try to disguise may be commit-
ting a particularly destructive violation of polite behavior—
perceiving the emotions people would like to disguise—and 
that women are more concerned about this violation than are 
men. There is evidence that close friends in particular have a 
need to respect each other’s emotional privacy by not detect-
ing unpleasant emotional truths that are hidden. Sternglanz 
and DePaulo (2004) found that close friends were worse than 
less close friends at reading unpleasant emotions but only 
when those unpleasant emotions were intended to be hidden. 
Interestingly, the hidden information that close friends failed 
to detect in that study was not even threatening to the relation-
ship. While past researchers of empathic accuracy have 
argued that friends should be accurate at recognizing emo-
tions that are nonthreatening to the relationship, most of those 
studies have not explicitly explored deception detection, 
which is a more challenging form of empathic accuracy 
because the senders are intentionally concealing their true 
emotions. Therefore, it may be the case that motivated inac-
curacy in deception detection can occur with very little moti-
vation; the conscious or unconscious respect for a friend’s 
emotional privacy may be sufficient.
When and Why Friends Might Be 
Superior to Strangers at Detecting 
Deception
Intuitively, we would expect that friends should be better 
at discerning information about each others’ thoughts, 
feelings, and traits than strangers—and this is generally 
the case (Stinson & Ickes, 1992). Friends show superior 
accuracy in understanding each other’s personality traits, 
as compared with strangers (Funder & Colvin, 1988; 
Paulhus & Bruce, 1992), and friends’ advantage in this 
domain is not merely based on assumed similarity (Funder, 
Kolar, & Blackman, 1995). Friends are also better than 
strangers at decoding each other’s thoughts and feelings 
(e.g., Ansfield, DePaulo, & Bell, 1995; Thomas & Fletcher, 
2003).
Friends may also be more accurate in detecting deception 
than strangers due to the advantages of familiarity. Friends’ 
experiences with each other allow them to read the subtext 
of each other’s communications intuitively and automati-
cally (Colvin, Vogt, & Ickes, 1997). People often spot lies 
by targeting behaviors or phrases that seem different from 
the norm (Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1982). Because 
friends know each other’s baseline behaviors and manner of 
speech, deviations from those baseline norms may enable 
friends to detect behavioral anomalies with superior accu-
racy. Indeed, people believe that their friends are more likely 
to detect their lies than are acquaintances (DePaulo & 
Kashy, 1998).
Friends who feel particularly close to each other might 
have an advantage in detecting deception over friends who 
feel less close to each other. In a daily diary study of every-
day lies, DePaulo and Kashy (1998) included measures of 
self-reported relationship closeness, how long participants 
had known the relationship partner, and how frequently par-
ticipants interacted with the relationship partner. Only rela-
tionship closeness was correlated with the likelihood that the 
lies were eventually discovered. Thus, it appears likely that 
emotional closeness, rather than merely spending time 
together, is the key component in successful lie detection. 
This is exactly what Anderson, DePaulo, and Ansfield (2002) 
found in their study of friends’ ability to detect deception at 
two points in time; only the close friends became more accu-
rate over time.
Can Friends Detect Lies Indirectly?
Whether or not friends are better than strangers at detecting 
deception, it is possible that friends can indirectly sense when 
their friends are lying even if they cannot quite make the cor-
rect judgment call. Although the accuracy of judges is typi-
cally only slightly better than chance when they are asked to 
decide whether a sender is lying or being truthful, certain 
studies have shown that judges can detect deception indi-
rectly even when their explicit choices are inaccurate (see 
DePaulo & Morris, 2004, for a review). For example, when 
judges rate a sender who is lying, they perceive that sender as 
being more ambivalent, less comfortable, and exhibiting 
more cognitive effort than a sender who is being truthful 
(DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, & Rosenkrantz, 1982; Hurd & 
Noller, 1988; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). Furthermore, 
judges feel more suspicious, less comfortable, and less confi-
dent when they are watching someone who is lying rather 
than being truthful (Anderson, 1999; Anderson et al., 2002; 
DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997). 
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Judges’ ratings of these indirect variables are correlated with 
whether the sender is lying, even when the judges make inac-
curate guesses as to whether the sender is lying or being truth-
ful (ten Brinke, Stimson, & Carney, 2014). While the existence 
of various indirect cues to deception has been found across 
many studies, there is debate as to whether indirect cues are 
actually more accurate than explicit cues (see Levine & Bond, 
2014).
Notably, most explicit and indirect deception detection 
studies take place with strangers or brief acquaintances, 
rather than close relationship partners. In the few deception 
detection studies with relationship partners, the pattern of 
indirect lie detection was stronger among friends (Anderson 
et al., 2002) and romantic partners (Anderson et al., 1999) 
than among strangers. Therefore, the question of whether 
friends are more accurate than strangers in detecting decep-
tion should explore both explicit and indirect measures of 
deception detection.
The Importance of the Sender in Close 
Friends’ Deception Detection Accuracy
Most studies of deception detection focus on the role of the 
“judge,” the person who is judging whether someone else is 
behaving truthfully or deceptively, rather than the “sender,” 
the person sending verbal and nonverbal cues while being 
truthful or deceptive (Levine, 2010). This focus on the judge 
is understandable given that judges’ decisions are the mark-
ers used to gauge accuracy. However, it is possible that 
judges are accurate not because of their own deception detec-
tion skills but because the senders are behaving in a way that 
makes them especially readable to the judge. In studies 
examining accuracy in guessing people’s emotions when no 
deception is involved, interpersonal sensitivity is related 
more to the sender’s expressivity than to the judge’s percep-
tivity (Snodgrass, Hecht, & Ploutz-Snyder, 1998). Although 
one would expect that judges who are high in trait empathy 
would demonstrate more empathic accuracy, empathy only 
improves accuracy when the target is highly expressive 
(Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008).
Examining both the role of the judge’s capabilities to 
detect deception and the sender’s abilities to deceive is par-
ticularly important in the context of friendships. When 
friends are more accurate than strangers, is their decoding 
advantage due to the fact that the judges are particularly 
knowledgeable about their friends’ normal behavior and 
idiosyncrasies, or is their decoding advantage due to the fact 
that the senders express emotions that are specifically read-
able to their friends? In other words, is friends’ decoding 
advantage due to superior judges or superior senders?
There is evidence for both possibilities. Buller and Aune 
(1987) found that deceptive senders leaked differing amounts 
of affect-related nonverbal cues to strangers than to friends or 
romantic partners, indicating that senders’ behavior plays an 
important role in deception among friends versus strangers. 
Fleming, Darley, Hilton, and Kojetin (1990) asked senders to 
convey, via a videotaped message, which of four songs the 
judge should choose. They were told that the same video 
would be shown to their close friends as well as strangers, and 
their goal was to get their friends to pick the correct song 
while the strangers pick the incorrect song. The strategy that 
most of the senders spontaneously used was to insert falsified 
personal information that only their friends would notice. 
However, a small group of senders used nonverbal cues—
characteristic facial expressions which would be recognized 
only by their friends due to the past usage of those expression 
within the friendship. Close friends were able to detect these 
subtle hints and decode the senders’ true meaning while 
strangers could not. Thus, senders can communicate lies that 
are unseen by strangers but visible to friends (Fleming et al., 
1990) when their intention is to convey the truth only to their 
friends.
Some have argued, though, that it is the judges’ knowl-
edge about their friends that causes them to be more accurate 
than strangers who lack that knowledge (Ickes & Simpson, 
1997; Stinson & Ickes, 1992). However, most studies show-
ing that friends are more accurate than strangers at judging a 
sender’s true thoughts and feelings are based upon video-
tapes of the senders made at a single point in time. These 
types of studies cannot rule out the possibility that the sender 
has already become more readable to the friend over the 
course of the friendship prior to the study, and that this 
increased readability is responsible for the higher accuracy 
between friends.
To answer the question of whether the advantage in decep-
tion detection accuracy of friends over strangers is due to the 
judge or the sender, a longitudinal study of newly developing 
friendships is necessary. The best time to explore this ques-
tion is as the relationship is first developing to see who is 
becoming more accurate or more readable over time. 
Anderson et al. (2002) found that emotionally close friends 
improve at detecting each other’s lies during the first 6 
months of friendship. However, their study was not designed 
to test whether the judge or the sender was driving that 
improved accuracy. The current study directly tested whether 
the improved accuracy is due to an improvement in the abil-
ity of the judges or whether the senders communicate their 
truths and lies differently as their friendship develops over 
time.
Research Questions
In the present research, we recruited 45 pairs of same-sex 
friends who had known each other for no more than 1 month, 
but who still considered themselves “friends.” One friend 
from each pair was randomly assigned the role of “sender”; 
each sender was videotaped expressing both truthful and 
faked emotional responses to pleasant and unpleasant video 
clips. For half of these emotional displays, senders were told 
that the intended audience was their friend while the other 
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half were intended for a stranger. The other friend from each 
pair was assigned as “judge” and watched a video of the 
senders’ emotional responses, attempted to detect whether 
senders’ emotional responses were truthful or faked, and 
attempted to guess whether the video clips senders watched 
were pleasant or unpleasant. Judges also completed two 
potential indirect measures of deception detection, including 
ratings of senders’ expressivity and intensity. Each judge 
watched eight videos of his or her friend and eight videos of 
a same-sex stranger. This procedure occurred at Time 1 (1 
month into the friendship) and Time 2 (6 months into the 
friendship). In addition, judges at Time 2 rejudged the send-
ers’ videos from Time 1; this was called the Re-do condition. 
Using this procedure, we were able to address the following 
five research questions:
Research Question 1: Do friends differ from strangers in 
their ability to detect each other’s lies and accurately read 
each other’s true emotions?
Although it may seem intuitive that friends would be supe-
rior to strangers on these tasks, past studies do not provide 
unqualified evidence that this is the case (Anderson et al., 
1999; Ickes & Simpson, 1997; McCornack & Levine, 1990; 
McCornack & Parks, 1986; Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004).
Research Question 2: Do close friends become more 
accurate judging their friends over time than they do judg-
ing strangers?
To test whether improvement over time is actually due to the 
friendship rather than just being due to judging the same per-
son twice, the key dependent variable will be a difference 
score representing the advantage in judging friends more 
accurately than strangers. Based on the results of Anderson 
et al. (2002), we anticipated that only close friends, but not 
less close friends, would show a greater advantage in judging 
their friends more accurately than strangers over time.
Research Question 3: If close friends show a greater 
advantage in judging friends more accurately than strang-
ers over time, is this due to an improvement in judges’ 
ability to decode the feelings of close friends or improved 
sender readability within close friendships?
If, as shown by Anderson et al. (2002), judges are more accu-
rate at decoding their close friends at Time 2 (6 months into 
the friendship) than at Time 1 (1 month into the friendship), 
this could mean either that judges were improving or that 
senders were becoming more readable to their close friends. 
Intuitively, one might attribute such improvements to the 
judges; however, the potential role of the sender should not 
be overlooked (Levine, 2010; Levine et al., 2011).
Our experimental design was intended to tease apart the 
roles of the senders versus the judges in any improvements 
over time. To test whether the improvement is driven by the 
judge, the sender, or both, we also asked judges to rejudge 
the senders’ clips from Time 1 at Time 2 (called the Re-do 
condition). If judges were more accurate at judging senders 
in the Re-do condition than at Time 1, this would indicate 
that the improvements were due to changes in judges’ apti-
tude over time (because the sender clips are identical in these 
two conditions). On the contrary, if judges were more accu-
rate at Time 2 than in the Re-do condition, this would indi-
cate that senders’ encoding ability has improved over time 
(because the judges made both of these judgments at Time 
2). It should be noted that these two possibilities are not 
mutually exclusive. A third possibility is that accuracy was 
greatest at Time 2, followed by the Re-do condition, which in 
turn had greater accuracy than Time 1; this would indicate 
improvements over time in both judges’ aptitude and send-
ers’ encoding.
Research Question 4: Will friends show evidence of 
motivated inaccuracy when their friends are hiding 
unpleasant emotion from them?
Consistent with the findings of Sternglanz and DePaulo 
(2004) and the concept of motivated inaccuracy presented by 
Ickes and Simpson (1997), we predicted that friends would 
do particularly poorly detecting the unpleasant emotions of 
their friends specifically when their friends were attempting 
to disguise those unpleasant emotions by feigning pleasant 
emotions.
Research Question 5: Can senders’ deceptive and truth-
ful emotions be distinguished by judges’ responses to 
indirect measures? If so, does this ability differ for friends 
versus strangers?
Previous research (see Anderson et al., 2002; DePaulo, 1994; 
DePaulo & Morris, 2004) indicates that people can often dis-
tinguish between truthful and deceptive communications on 
indirect or implicit measures, sometimes even when they 
cannot do so explicitly. Because the judges in this study rated 
facial expressions, we chose indirect measures appropriate 
for nonverbal communication. We examined whether judges 
could detect deception indirectly by asking judges to rate 
senders’ expressivity and intensity across all conditions. We 
also compared these two indirect measures of deception 
detection for friends versus strangers.
Method
Participants
Experimenters contacted students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course within 2 weeks after the beginning of the 
semester at a university in the Southeastern United States. 
Students were told that they would be eligible to participate 
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in the study if they and a same-sex friend whom they had not 
known before the beginning of the semester completed sepa-
rate applications for the study. Pairs in which each person 
indicated on the application forms that they were indeed 
friends and had known each other for less than a month were 
invited to participate in the study. The first session was 
scheduled approximately a month into their friendship, and a 
second session was scheduled 5 months later. A total of 45 
pairs (19 male pairs and 26 female pairs) completed both ses-
sions. The sample included 71 Caucasians, six African 
Americans, five Asians, two Latinos, three biracial partici-
pants, and three who did not provide ethnic information.
At the beginning of each of the two sessions, each friend 
completed the Subjective Closeness Index for the friendship 
(see Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). This index included two 
questions: “Relative to all of your other relationships, how 
would you characterize your relationship with this person?” 
and “Relative to what you know about other people’s close 
relationships, how would you characterize your relationship 
to this person?” Answers ranged from 1 (much less close 
than others) to 9 (much closer than others). Friendships were 
classified as close if both friends gave a mean response on 
these questions of 6 or greater during both the first and sec-
ond sessions; thus, friends were considered close if they both 
felt close to each other 1 month into the friendship and 
remained close 5 months later. Twenty-five pairs of friends 
were classified as close and 20 pairs as not especially close. 
The mean closeness ratings for the close friends were 6.81 
and 7.10 at 1 month and 6 months, respectively; the mean 
closeness ratings for the less close friends were 5.38 and 4.50 
at 1 month and 6 months, respectively. At the same time, 
when participants rated how close they felt to their friend, 
they also rated their amount of self-disclosure in that friend-
ship, as measured by how many topics they discussed with 
their friends (answers ranged from 0 to 18 topics, and the 
topics included movies, personal crises, clothes, dating, fam-
ily conflict, sex life, grades, etc.). The relational self-disclo-
sure measure was used to confirm the closeness 
categorizations. A three-way ANOVA (Relationship 
Closeness × Dyad Gender × Time) found that the close 
friendships included more self-disclosure (M = 10.60) than 
the less close friendships (M = 7.41), F(1, 41) = 16.01, p < 
.001 (self-disclosure was averaged between the two friends). 
This difference in self-disclosure between close and less 
close friends was equally true of men and women and did not 
change significantly from 1 month to 6 months into the 
friendship.
Design
This repeated-measures study utilized a seven-way mixed 
design. The two between-participant variables included the 
closeness of the friendships (close vs. less close) and the sex 
of the same-sex pairs (male vs. female). The five within-par-
ticipant independent variables included the type of movie 
clips the judges watched (pleasant vs. unpleasant), the 
instructions senders were given (show their true emotional 
reactions to the clips vs. fake the opposite reaction), whom 
the senders were instructed to convey expressions to (their 
friend vs. a stranger), whose facial reactions the judges rated 
(their friend vs. a stranger), and which time the ratings were 
made (Session 1, Session 2, or the rerating of Session 1 facial 
expressions completed during Session 2 which was called 
the Re-do condition). The statistical power of this design was 
enhanced due to the many within-participant variables. Each 
participant provided data in every condition of the study. 
Because most statistical comparisons were made within indi-
viduals as opposed to between individuals (with the excep-
tion of relationship closeness and gender), individual 
differences between participants were removed as a source 
of variability. For this reason, effect sizes and power tend to 
be higher in within-participant designs than between-partici-
pant designs, even with fewer participants (Aron, Coups, & 
Aron, 2013).
Dependent variables included direct and indirect mea-
sures of the judges’ accuracy in detecting the senders’ truths 
and lies. The direct measures included the judges’ guesses 
about whether the senders were showing their true emotion 
or the opposite, whether the senders were actually watching 
a pleasant or unpleasant movie clip, ratings of how genuine 
the senders’ facial reactions were, and ratings of how pleas-
ant the sender was feeling. These ratings were considered 
“direct” because they explicitly required that participants 
make guesses about the independent variables manipulated 
in the experiment (whether the senders were being genuine 
and whether they were responding to pleasant or unpleasant 
stimuli). Indirect measures included judges’ ratings of how 
intense the senders were feeling and how expressive the 
senders’ facial reactions were. These two ratings were con-
sidered potential “indirect” measures of deception because it 
is possible that the judges’ intensity or expressivity ratings 
could reliably distinguish between senders’ truthful versus 
deceptive communications despite the fact that the items did 
not explicitly ask participants about deception.
Materials and Procedure
Film clips. Each pair of friends watched a set of eight film 
clips during each session. These clips were selected from 
among approximately 50 clips pretested by students from an 
introductory social psychology class. The clips were pre-
tested for the primary emotional reaction elicited by the clip, 
as well as the extent to which the clip was humorous, sad, 
distressing, pleasant, or disgusting. The 24 clips that had the 
highest ratings for pleasantness/humor or the highest ratings 
for unpleasantness/sadness, without any gender differences 
in the pretested sample, were included in the pool of clips for 
this study. Pleasant clips included funny scenes from come-
dic films (e.g., When Harry Met Sally) and television pro-
grams such as Saturday Night Live. Unpleasant clips depicted 
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traumatic events such as someone dying from cancer, a cou-
ple fighting, parents finding a child dead, and someone say-
ing goodbye to loved ones. Three sets of eight clips were 
created (four pleasant and four unpleasant clips in each set 
presented in a counterbalanced order). Each dyad watched 
one of the sets of clips during Session 1 and a different set 
during Session 2. Ratings of the video clips from Session 1 
were used as a manipulation check of the pleasantness of the 
clips. A within-participant t test confirmed that the pleasant 
clips were indeed rated as being substantially more pleasant 
than the unpleasant clips (M = 6.24 vs. M = 2.01, respec-
tively, on a 0-8 scale), t(88) = 20.73, p < .001.
First session. Before the first session, one friend from each 
pair was randomly assigned to the role of judge and the other 
friend was assigned to the role of sender. While the judge 
was out of the room, the sender was given an instruction 
sheet describing how to respond while watching the eight 
movie clips (four amusing/pleasant clips and four sad/
unpleasant clips). The senders were instructed to show how 
they felt during half of the clips and to show the opposite of 
how they felt during the other clips (to “fool” the person who 
would be watching the videotape of them). In addition, send-
ers were given instructions about the target audience for their 
emotional expressions. Senders were instructed to convey 
how they felt (or the opposite) to their friend or to a stranger. 
The order of these instructions was counterbalanced across 
the eight clips. Senders were aware that they would be video-
taped while watching the movie clips.
The experimenter then brought the judge into the room 
and placed a 6-foot high partition between the participants so 
that they could not see each other’s facial expressions while 
viewing the movie clips. The two friends were instructed not 
to talk while watching the clips and the judge listened to the 
movie clips using noise-canceling headphones so that any 
noises (e.g., laughter) from the sender would not be heard. 
While they watched the movie clips, both the sender and the 
judge rated on 0- to 8-point scales their true emotional reac-
tions to the clips (pleasant, intense, amused, distressed, and 
sad). The experimenter went to a video control room and 
recorded the sender as he or she watched the eight clips. The 
experimenter only taped the sender while each movie clip 
was running and covered the video camera lens between 
clips.
Upon completion of this portion of the study, the partici-
pants were informed that they would view the videotape 
made of the sender’s facial expressions as well as a tape of a 
sender they did not know from another pair of friends 
(referred to as the “yoked” pair of strangers). The order of 
whom they watched first was counterbalanced. Because the 
judges had already watched the same movie clips as their 
friends in the same order, the experimenter began by show-
ing the third facial expression segment through the eighth 
segment and then showed the first two segments at the end. 
The judges were only told that the persons they were viewing 
would be showing their true responses to the clips some of 
the time and opposite emotions at other times; they were not 
told that exactly half of the expressions would be faked.
As the judge and sender watched the videotapes of facial 
expressions, they were given a facial ratings booklet. The 
dependent variables measured in this booklet included four 
direct measures of accuracy—two dichotomous and two 
continuous. Participants were asked to guess whether the 
senders were watching a pleasant or unpleasant movie clip 
and guess whether the senders were trying to show what 
they were feeling or the opposite of what they were feeling 
during each clip. Correct guesses were coded as 1, and 
incorrect guesses were coded as 0. Therefore, means on 
these dichotomous variables ranged from 0 to 1 and can be 
interpreted as the percentage of guesses senders made cor-
rectly (50% is considered as accurate as chance).1 Accuracy 
was also measured using continuous 9-point scales along 
which participants rated how pleasant the senders’ feelings 
were and how genuine/sincere the senders’ facial reactions 
were. The booklet also included two dependent variables 
that did not measure accuracy but were included as potential 
indirect measures of lie detection. Along 9-point scales, par-
ticipants rated how intense the senders’ feelings were and 
how expressive the senders’ facial expressions were. The 
facial ratings booklet included ratings for the above six 
dependent variables in response to watching each of the 
eight facial expressions of the friend sender and the eight 
facial expressions of the sender from the yoked pair. 
Although both the judges and the senders completed the 
facial ratings booklet, the focus of this article was the judges’ 
ratings of the senders rather than the senders’ ratings of 
themselves. The senders’ ratings of themselves were not 
included in the data analysis.
Second session. Approximately 5 months later, each pair of 
friends returned for their second session. The friends main-
tained their previously assigned roles of sender and judge, 
and they were yoked with the same pair they had seen on 
tape during the first session. The same procedure from the 
first session was followed; once again, the sender was video-
taped watching a different selection of eight movie clips, and 
then the judge and sender used the facial ratings booklet to 
rate the sender’s expressions as well as the videotapes of the 
sender from the yoked pair. Again, because the judge had 
watched the same movie clips as his or her friend, the experi-
menter began by showing the third facial expression segment 
through the eighth segment and then showed the first two 
segments at the end.
In addition to creating and rating the new videotapes of 
the senders’ facial expressions filmed during the second ses-
sion, the participants also rewatched and rerated the original 
videotapes of both senders’ facial expressions from the first 
session. Instead of viewing the videotapes in the same order 
as they were viewed during the first session (beginning with 
the third segment), this time participants began with the first 
segment and watched them in the order in which they were 
originally filmed.
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Results
Overview of Analysis
The six dependent variables included the dichotomous and 
continuous measures of lie detection/genuineness, the 
dichotomous and continuous measures of accuracy detecting 
pleasant/unpleasant emotion, and the two potential indirect 
cues of lie detection—expressivity and intensity. For each of 
the six dependent variables, a separate seven-way repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted. These seven-way 
repeated-measures ANOVAs included the following within-
participant variables: type of movie clips the judges watched 
(pleasant vs. unpleasant), the instructions senders were given 
(show their true emotional reactions to the clips vs. fake the 
opposite reaction), whom the senders were instructed to con-
vey expressions to (their friend vs. a stranger), whose facial 
reactions the judges rated (their friend vs. a stranger), and at 
which time the ratings were made (Session 1, Session 2, or 
the rerating of Session 1 facial expressions completed during 
Session 2). The two between-participant variables were the 
closeness of the friendships (close vs. less close) and the sex 
of the same-sex pairs (male vs. female).
Higher Accuracy Judging Friends Than Strangers
On the dichotomous measure of accuracy in lie detection, 
judges were more accurate at guessing whether senders were 
showing or faking emotion when judging friends (M = 61%, 
95% confidence interval [CI] = [57%, 65%]) than strangers 
(M = 48%, 95% CI = [45%, 51%]), F(1, 41) = 33.96, p < 
.001, η2 = .45. Similarly, on the continuous measure of per-
ceived genuineness, judges thought their friend’s facial 
expressions were more genuine when their friends were 
being truthful rather than lying but they thought that the 
stranger’s facial expression was more genuine when the 
stranger was lying rather than being truthful, indicating a 
pattern of accuracy for friends but inaccuracy for strangers, 
F(1, 41) = 48.93, p < .001, η2 = .54 (see Table 1). For both the 
dichotomous measure of accuracy in lie detection and the 
continuous measure of perceived genuineness, the pattern 
that judges were more accurate when judging friends than 
strangers remained consistent regardless of whether the 
senders were being truthful or lying.
Similarly, on the continuous measure of perceived pleas-
antness, judges were only significantly accurate when judg-
ing friends but not when judging strangers. When judging 
friends, the judges thought the sender’s feelings were more 
pleasant when the clip actually was pleasant than unpleasant, 
F(1, 41) = 8.00, p = .007, η2 = .16 (see Table 1). Although 
this pattern of accuracy for friends was greater when the 
senders were being genuine, the accuracy for friends still 
remained significant even when the friends were faking their 
emotion, F(1, 41) = 41.80, p < .001, η2 = .51. On the dichoto-
mous measure of accuracy in guessing emotion, judges were 
also more accurate at guessing whether the movie clip was 
pleasant or unpleasant when they were judging a friend (M = 
62%, 95% CI = [58%, 65%]) than when judging a stranger 
(M = 51%, 95% CI = [47%, 54%]), F(1, 41) = 14.89, p < 
.001, η2 = .27. All four of the dependent variables measuring 
accuracy showed that people were more accurate judging 
their friends than strangers. While this pattern did not vary 
depending upon whether the sender was being genuine or 
deceptive for three of those four variables, it did vary on the 
dichotomous measure of emotion detection. When it came to 
guessing the senders’ actual emotions, judges were more 
accurate judging the emotions of friends than strangers when 
the senders were being truthful but not when the sender was 
being deceptive, F(1, 41) = 15.77, p < .001, η2 = .28.
There was some evidence of motivated inaccuracy when 
judges attempted to guess their friend’s disguised unpleasant 
emotions. When the senders were displaying their true emo-
tions, judges were consistently more accurate guessing the 
emotions of their friends than strangers. However, when the 
senders were faking their emotions, the advantage in judging 
Table 1. Accuracy of Perceived Genuineness and Perceived Pleasantness When Judging Friends Versus Strangers.
Truth Lie Accuracy
 M 95% CI M 95% CI Difference 95% CI
Ratings of genuineness
 Judging friend 5.59 [5.30, 5.89] 4.40 [4.06, 4.75] 1.19** [0.83, 1.55]
 Judging stranger 4.79 [4.55, 5.03] 5.08 [4.76, 5.39] −0.29* [−0.53, −0.04]
Pleasant clip Unpleasant clip Accuracy
M 95% CI M 95% CI Difference 95% CI
Ratings of pleasantness
 Judging friend 5.45 [5.22, 5.68] 4.77 [4.56, 4.98] 0.68** [0.36, 1.00]
 Judging stranger 5.12 [4.96, 5.27] 5.05 [4.83, 5.27] 0.06 [−0.20, 0.33]
Note. Higher difference scores indicate greater accuracy, and negative difference scores indicate inaccuracy. CI = confidence interval.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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friends more accurately than strangers was no longer signifi-
cant, and the most dramatic decrease occurred when the 
senders were disguising unpleasant emotions, F(1, 41) = 
5.96, p = .019, η2 = .13 (see Figure 1). Interestingly, judges 
became even less accurate judging their friends than strang-
ers when the senders were trying to disguise their unpleasant 
emotions (although this difference was not statistically 
significant).
The Advantage in Judging Friends More 
Accurately Than Strangers Increases Over Time 
Among Close Friends
For close friends, the advantage in judging friends more 
accurately than strangers on the dichotomous measure of lie 
detection was larger at Time 2 than at Time 1 or the Re-do. 
However, for less close friends, the advantage in judging 
friends more accurately than strangers decreased, and was 
smaller at Time 2 than at Time 1 or the Re-do, F(2, 82) = 
5.71, p = .005, η2 = .12. The same pattern was found for the 
dichotomous measure of guessing emotion. The advantage in 
guessing the emotions of friends more accurately than strang-
ers was strongest for close friends at Time 2 but weakest for 
less close friends at Time 2, F(2, 81) = 3.67, p = .03, η2 = .08. 
Similarly, for close friends, the advantage in perceiving gen-
uineness more accurately for friends than strangers was 
greater at Time 2 than at Time 1 or the Re-do. For less close 
friends, the advantage was smallest at Time 2, F(2, 82) = 
3.74, p = .028, η2 = .08 (see Table 2).
Simple effects tests were conducted to determine what was 
driving the changes over time. For the dichotomous measure 
of lie detection, close friends became marginally significantly 
more accurate judging their friends at Time 2 than at Time 1 
(p = .09) or the Re-do (p = .09; and Time 1 and the Re-do did 
not differ from each other). Close friends also became signifi-
cantly less accurate judging strangers at Time 2 than at Time 
1 (p = .045). For the dichotomous measure of guessing emo-
tion, close friends became significantly more accurate judg-
ing their friends at Time 2 than at Time 1 (p = .024) or the 
Re-do (p = .022; and Time 1 and the Re-do did not differ from 
each other; see Table 2). For both of these dependent vari-
ables, the accuracy of less close friends did not change at all.
Ratings of Expressivity
Judges thought that senders appeared significantly less expres-
sive at Time 2 (M = 5.24, 95% CI = [5.01, 5.48]) than at Time 
1 (M = 5.68, 95% CI = [5.40, 5.96], p = .009), with the Re-do 
falling in the middle (M = 5.46, 95% CI = [5.15, 5.77]), F(2, 
82) = 4.02, p = .022, η2 = .09. The perception that the senders 
became less expressive over time was held by friends and 
strangers alike, regardless of relationship closeness.
When judges rated a stranger, they found the stranger to 
be more expressive if the sender had been instructed to com-
municate to his or her friend (M = 5.58, 95% CI = [5.24, 
5.90]) than to a stranger (M = 5.22, 95% CI = [4.85, 5.59], 
p = .019). However, when judges rated their friend, they did 
not perceive any significant differences in their friend’s 
expressivity regardless of whether their friend was commu-
nicating to them (M = 5.49, 95% CI = [5.19, 5.79]) or to a 
stranger (M = 5.55, 95% CI = [5.29, 5.82], p = .68), F(1, 41) 
= 4.65, p = .037, η2 = .10.
Figure 1. The advantage in judging friends more accurately than strangers as a function of the pleasantness of the clip and whether the 
sender is showing or hiding emotion.
Note. The bars represent the mean difference score in percent accuracy for friends minus strangers. Higher bars indicate greater accuracy in judging 
friends than strangers.
*These difference scores are significantly different from zero.
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Ratings of Expressivity as an Indirect Measure of 
Lie Detection Among Friends
For the following set of analyses, the same seven-way 
ANOVA was conducted except that the pleasant/unpleasant 
variable indicated whether the sender was attempting to dis-
play pleasant or unpleasant reactions to the film rather than 
whether the films themselves were pleasant or unpleasant.
Among friends only, ratings of expressivity appear to be an 
indirect measure of whether the sender was showing genuine or 
fake pleasant and unpleasant emotions. Among friends, pleas-
ant displays of emotion were rated as more expressive when 
they were genuine than when they were faked, and unpleasant 
displays of emotion were rated as less expressive when they 
were genuine than when they were faked. Essentially, judges 
view any attempt at sending pleasantness as more expressive 
than any attempt at sending unpleasantness—but judges still 
rate genuine pleasantness as more expressive—and genuine 
unpleasantness as less expressive—than the faked attempts at 
these emotions. This pattern was found among friends but not 
strangers, F(1, 41) = 59.81, p < .001, η2 = .59. Figure 2 displays 
these results on a spectrum from genuine pleasantness to genu-
ine unpleasantness. While perceived expressivity appears to be 
an indirect cue to deception among friends, perceived intensity 
was not found to be a significant indirect cue.
Discussion
This study tested whether people are more accurate detecting 
the deception and genuine emotion of their friends than 
strangers over the course of early friendship development. 
More specifically, this longitudinal study was designed to 
determine which person in the close friendship is responsible 
for the improved accuracy over time—the judge or the 
sender. In addition, data were collected to explore whether 
there might be evidence of both motivated inaccuracy 
between friends and indirect deception detection.
Friends Were More Accurate Than Strangers 
(Research Question 1)
In general, judges were more accurate detecting deception 
and guessing emotions of their friends than of strangers. 
These findings were consistent regardless of whether the 
judges made their decisions based on dichotomous choices 
or continuous ratings and, for most of the dependent vari-
ables, regardless of whether the senders were being truthful 
or deceptive.
The Advantage in Judging Friends More 
Accurately Than Strangers Increases Over Time 
in Close Friendships (Research Question 2)
Close friends became more accurate judging their friends at 
Time 2 than they had originally been at Time 1. This improve-
ment over time was marginally significant for deception 
detection and statistically significant for emotion detection. 
Less close friends showed no changes in accuracy over time, 
and people also did not become more accurate judging the 
Table 2. Percent Accuracy of Close Friends and Less Close Friends at Time 1, the Re-Do, and Time 2.
Time 1 Re-do Time 2
 M 95% CI M 95% CI M 95% CI
Accuracy detecting deception
 Close friends














   Advantage of friendship 6 [−4, 17] 8 [−3, 21] 28 [17, 40]
 Less close friends
  Judging friend 64 [57, 71] 64 [56, 72] 60 [53, 68]
  Judging stranger 48 [41, 55] 50 [42, 57] 55 [47, 62]
   Advantage of friendship 16 [7, 25] 14 [4, 25] 5 [−5, 16]
Accuracy judging emotion
 Close friends







  Judging stranger 50 [43, 57] 51 [42, 60] 49 [40, 58]
   Advantage of friendship 7 [−6, 20] 7 [−5, 20] 23 [11, 35]
 Less close friends
  Judging friend 61 [53, 69] 62 [54, 69] 58 [51, 66]
  Judging stranger 49 [43, 55] 50 [42, 58] 56 [48, 63]
   Advantage of friendship 12 [0, 24] 12 [0, 22] 2 [−8, 13]
Note. Means in the same row which have different subscript letters differ from each other. CI = confidence interval; Advantage of friendship = judge friend 
minus judge stranger.
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same stranger over time. This is a conceptual replication of 
the key finding of the study by Anderson et al. (2002) that 
close friends became more accurate over time but less close 
friends did not.
In past studies in which judges have had to guess whether 
a life story told by the sender is true or false (e.g., Anderson 
et al., 2002), the expected advantage that close friends have 
could be attributed to the fact that people have more knowl-
edge about their close friend’s life and therefore more infor-
mation upon which to evaluate those life stories. However, in 
the current study, the senders merely conveyed nonverbal 
expressions of emotion in reaction to film clips which would 
give no special advantage to close friends based on their 
knowledge of each other’s lives. Therefore, the advantage in 
judging close friends more accurately than less close friends 
or strangers does not rely upon having specific factual 
knowledge about the sender’s life.
Interestingly, accuracy at detecting the deception of 
strangers decreased from Time 1 to Time 2 but only for close 
friends. When these close friendships were fairly new at 
Time 1, the judges were almost as accurate judging strangers 
as they were judging their close friends (only 6% difference). 
Five months later at Time 2, close friends became more accu-
rate detecting the deception of their friends, and also less 
accurate detecting the deception of strangers, making the 
advantage in judging friends more accurately than strangers 
a 28% difference. Because this pattern only occurred among 
close friends, it may be due to an assumption that close 
friends should be able to read each other easily after being 
friends for many months. People intuitively believe that their 
friends can detect their lies more accurately than acquain-
tances (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and as people become 
closer, they become more confident in detecting each other’s 
lies (Levine & McCornack, 1992). It is possible that close 
friends in particular experienced high self-efficacy when 
judging their close friends at Time 2 and a relative lack of 
self-efficacy judging strangers in comparison. Consistent 
with past research on self-efficacy (Bandura & Wood, 1989), 
if these close friends assumed that they would do better judg-
ing their friends than strangers at Time 2, the relative lack of 
self-efficacy for judging strangers could have led to a self-
fulfilling prophecy in which they did not try as hard to detect 
the deception of strangers. Or similarly, feelings of self-effi-
cacy may have caused judges to feel more anxiety during the 
task and they may have done poorly because they focused 
more intently on unhelpful cues. These explanations are only 
speculative, as ratings of self-efficacy were not collected. 
Furthermore, because this pattern of results was unpredicted 
and only occurred for deception detection but not emotion 
detection, it is important to replicate this pattern in future 
research.
Improvement in the Accuracy of Close Friends 
Over Time Is Due to the Sender in Close 
Friendships (Research Question 3)
One important question not addressed by the design of the 
study by Anderson et al. (2002) is whether the development of 
close friends’ superior deception detection ability is due to 
changes over time in judges’ perceptive abilities regarding their 
close friends or to changes over time in senders’ expressive 
behavior within close friendships. We suspect that most people 
would intuit that both our findings and the findings of Anderson 
et al. are due largely to judges’ improvement at decoding their 
close friends’ nonverbal cues over time. However, as personal-
ity researchers have discussed at length (e.g., Funder, 2012; 
Human & Biesanz, 2011), interpersonal accuracy depends not 
only on judges’ detection ability but also on senders’ ability to 
communicate interpersonal phenomena effectively. The inclu-
sion of the Re-do condition in our study provides an effective 
way to tease apart improvements in judges’ detection ability 
from changes in senders’ communication.
If judges in close friendships become more skilled over 
time at detecting their close friends’ deceptions and true 
emotions, these judges should be more accurate in the Re-do 
condition than the “Time 1” condition because in the Re-do 
condition they are viewing the same Time 1 clips (in a differ-
ent order) but with the advantage of having 5 more months of 
close friendship. However, our data found that accuracy in 
the Time 1 and Re-do conditions was nearly identical indi-
cating that judges had no special advantage when they rerated 
the Time 1 clips 5 months later in their relationship.
On the contrary, if judges in close friendships are more 
accurate due to some change in their friends’ behavior over 
time, then these judges should be more accurate in the “Time 
2” condition than the Re-do condition because the Time 2 con-
dition shows their close friend conveying emotions 6 months 
into the friendship, while the Re-do condition shows their 
close friend only 1 month into the friendship. Surprisingly, our 
findings largely support this less intuitive theory, namely, that 
Figure 2. Expressivity ratings of friends and strangers arranged 
on a spectrum from genuinely pleasant to genuinely unpleasant 
displays of emotion.
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senders’ communicative behaviors (rather than the judges’ 
detection skills) change over time in a way that improves 
accuracy within a close friendship. At the second testing ses-
sion, close friends were more accurate at detecting deception 
and guessing emotion when they viewed the nonverbal behav-
iors of their friend conveyed 6 months into the friendship than 
when they viewed the previous nonverbal behaviors of their 
friend conveyed 5 months earlier. In sum, judges’ accuracy in 
detecting their close friends’ deception improves over time, 
but this improvement appears to be due to some change in the 
way their close friends express themselves, rather than an 
improvement in their own decoding ability.
Although it is not clear exactly how the close friends are 
acting differently 6 months into the friendship in a way that 
enables their friends to judge their emotions more accurately, 
it must include subtle nonverbal behaviors which strangers 
and less close friends cannot pick up on. A potential explana-
tion is that the nonverbal behaviors of the senders become 
more subtle and idiosyncratic later in the friendship, and this 
subtlety makes it more difficult for strangers and less close 
friends to distinguish between the genuine and faked dis-
plays of emotions, whereas the close friends can. In support 
of this explanation, the data indicate that judges perceived 
senders as less expressive at Time 2 than at Time 1. It is pos-
sible that senders were perceived as more expressive at Time 
1 because they utilized general display rules of emotion or 
exaggerated their expressions. This could have increased 
accuracy detecting deception if genuine but exaggerated 
expressions were seen as more real (e.g., Duchenne-like 
smiles), while the deceptive exaggerated expressions may 
have appeared more forced and disingenuous. The fact that 
senders became less expressive at Time 2 may be an indica-
tion that they used more idiosyncratic, subtle expressions at 
Time 2 possibly because they were more familiar and com-
fortable with the task. Perhaps close friends at Time 2 
guessed that an expression was genuine because it looked 
more natural and idiosyncratic, in contrast to which the faked 
emotions might have looked awkward and uncharacteristic 
of their friend. The differences between these less expressive 
displays of genuine and faked emotion at Time 2 must have 
been quite subtle, however, because only close friends were 
able to distinguish between the two, while less close friends 
and strangers were not.
According to self-report data from the senders in a differ-
ent study (Fleming et al., 1990), senders intentionally use 
characteristic facial expressions that are more likely to be 
recognized by their friends. However, in our study, close 
friends were more accurate at Time 2 regardless of whether 
the senders were intentionally sending to their friend or to a 
stranger, and regardless of whether the senders were attempt-
ing to convey or fake their emotions. Therefore, whatever 
nonverbal cues the senders emitted were unlikely to be con-
scious in this case. Although it may seem surprising that 
close friends were just as accurate at Time 2 if their friend 
was sending to them or to a stranger, strangers did in fact 
perceive a significant difference in expressivity depending 
upon whom the intended audience was. In both sessions of 
the study, strangers found senders more expressive if the 
sender was sending to a friend than to a stranger. In contrast, 
participants found their friends to be equally expressive 
regardless of their intended audience, perhaps because they 
were more familiar with their friends’ idiosyncratic expres-
sions and could recognize them even if they were more sub-
tle. The surprising finding that the accuracy of friends was 
unaffected by whether the senders were sending to them or to 
strangers may have occurred precisely because friends did 
not notice any differences in expressivity depending upon 
the intended audience. Although less close friends also failed 
to notice the differences in expressivity, only close friends 
were able to distinguish between those less expressive genu-
ine and faked emotions at Time 2.
Friends Were Not More Accurate Than Strangers 
in Detecting Disguised Unpleasant Emotions 
(Research Question 4)
The most dramatic decrease in the accuracy advantage for 
friendship occurred when friends attempted to deceive 
judges about their unpleasant emotions by feigning pleasant 
emotions. This was the only condition in which friends were 
even less accurate than strangers (although not significantly 
so). These results support past findings of motivated inaccu-
racy among close friends (Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004). 
When friends attempt to disguise their unpleasant emotions, 
they may do so to protect their friendship. For example, 
friends may disguise interpersonal feelings of envy, anger, or 
sadness if they feel socially excluded to maintain positive 
feelings within the friendship. Therefore, it may be in the 
best interest of our friendships to take our friends’ faked pos-
itive emotions at face value.
However, given the stimuli used in this study, it is unlikely 
that friends’ diminished accuracy detecting disguised 
unpleasant emotion was due to any real threat to the friend-
ship. The judges knew that the senders’ facial expressions 
were in response to film clips which were irrelevant to their 
friendship. Our study is not the first to find that friends are 
inaccurate detecting hidden unpleasant emotions even when 
those emotions pose no threat to the friendship (see 
Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004). One possible explanation is 
that friends fail to detect disguised unpleasant emotions 
regardless of whether they are harmful to the relationship 
due to an overgeneralization of a process that is adaptive in 
situations where the recognition of concealed negative emo-
tions has negative consequences. Another possible explana-
tion is that inaccuracy is not self-motivated but is instead a 
result of being polite and respecting someone’s emotional 
privacy when they wish to keep their negative emotions hid-
den (DePaulo, Wetzel, Sternglanz, & Walker Wilson, 2003; 
Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). While the expression of 
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genuine unpleasant emotion may be a call to action which 
friends need to recognize and be responsive to (Clark, 
Fitness, & Brissette, 2000), when friends disguise their nega-
tive emotions, it may be because they do not wish to be 
helped. When people fail to detect their friends’ disguised 
unpleasant emotions, they may, in effect, make a challenging 
situation go more smoothly by allowing their friends to deal 
with their emotions privately. Surprisingly, in our study and 
another study (Sternglanz & DePaulo, 2004), friends’ inac-
curacy detecting disguised or concealed unpleasant emotion 
occurred even when the senders were not sending to their 
friends. Thus, it may be that when people put on a happy face 
to conceal their negative emotions from their friends or from 
strangers, their friends unconsciously respect the sender’s 
desire for emotional privacy by failing to detect the hidden 
unpleasant emotion.
It is important for a friendship, however, that friends 
detect genuine displays of unpleasant emotion which may be 
expressed for the purpose of receiving support, empathy, or 
help without having to ask (Clark et al., 2000). Not surpris-
ingly, the advantage in guessing the emotions of friends more 
accurately than strangers was largest in our study when send-
ers conveyed truthful unpleasant emotions (76% accuracy). 
It may be especially important to correctly identify friends’ 
intentionally conveyed unpleasant emotions so that we can 
be responsive to their needs. In a study of helping behavior 
between partners, people were particularly responsive to 
their partner’s nonverbal need cues if their partner had just 
provided them an appropriate form of help (DePaulo, 
Brittingham, & Kaiser, 1983). The reciprocal helping that is 
common in friendships may improve people’s ability to 
detect their friends’ genuine unpleasant emotions and recog-
nize when their friends are in need of help.
Expressivity Is an Indirect Deception Detection 
Cue for Friends Only (Research Question 5)
Judges in our study perceived their friends as more expres-
sive when their friends attempted to express pleasantness 
than when they attempted to express unpleasantness. 
However, their friends always appeared more expressive 
when they had actually viewed a pleasant clip than when 
they were pretending to have viewed a pleasant clip. In other 
words, truthfully shown pleasantness appears more expres-
sive than an attempt at faked pleasantness; likewise, truth-
fully shown unpleasantness appears less expressive than an 
attempt at faking unpleasantness. In sum, judges see any 
attempt at sending pleasantness as more expressive than any 
attempt at sending unpleasantness, but judges still rate send-
ers’ genuine pleasantness as more expressive—and senders’ 
genuine unpleasantness as more unexpressive—than the 
“faked” attempts at either of these emotions. Thus, the degree 
of perceived expressivity is an indirect cue of deceptive emo-
tional displays, and this pattern was only found between 
friends. Ratings of expressivity for strangers remained fairly 
consistent regardless of what type of emotion they were 
attempting to express truthfully or deceptively.
Expressivity may be an indirect cue to deception between 
friends. It is possible that this is due to a lack of awareness 
among senders that they tend to be more expressive when 
experiencing pleasant than unpleasant emotion. If they are 
unaware of that pattern, then their faked pleasant and unpleas-
ant emotions may not be as different from each other in terms 
of expressivity as their genuine pleasant and unpleasant emo-
tions, as our results indicated. This would make their faked 
pleasant emotions not quite expressive enough and their faked 
unpleasant emotions too expressive. These differences in 
expressivity may be too subtle to recognize in strangers but 
friends may notice the differences because they have experi-
ence witnessing their friend’s range of expressivity.
The pattern found in our study, that senders were more 
expressive when attempting to convey pleasant emotions 
than unpleasant emotions, may be due to the particular emo-
tions elicited by the video clips which the senders were react-
ing to. Among the six basic emotions, happiness, anger, and 
disgust are the easiest to recognize (Wagner, MacDonald, & 
Manstead, 1986). If the unpleasant clips in our study had 
evoked anger or disgust as opposed to sadness, then perhaps 
judges would have perceived those unpleasant displays of 
emotion as equally expressive as the responses to the happy/
humorous clips. Although our study found that perceived 
expressivity was an indirect cue to deception, future research 
should test this using a broader array of emotions.
Potential Alternative Explanations and 
Methodological Issues
In this study, both the senders and judges watched the same 
film clips before the judges guessed whether the senders’ 
reactions were genuine or faked. Because the judges were 
familiar with the stimuli that the senders were responding to, 
the types of judgments made in this study were similar to 
judgments commonly made in everyday life. Friends or 
strangers may be in the same place, experiencing the same 
set of events, and be unsure how the other person feels about 
what just occurred. In this type of interpersonal perception 
task, the judge is aware of the context and thus knows what 
the possible range of emotions might be.
While this methodological choice may have increased 
external validity, it also allows for a potential alternative 
explanation of the results. Because the judges in this study 
had also watched the pleasant and unpleasant film clips, the 
possibility that the judges’ accuracy was influenced by their 
familiarity with the stimuli needs to be addressed. While the 
judges were aware that half of the film clips were pleasant 
and half were unpleasant, they were not told that the senders 
would be showing their genuine emotion exactly half of the 
time and their faked emotion exactly half of the time. Because 
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the judges did not know how many genuine or faked emo-
tions they would observe, it is unlikely that they would have 
been able to improve their accuracy by using process of 
elimination on the last few video clips. Given how difficult it 
is to detect deception according to meta-analytic estimates of 
only 54% (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), and how difficult it was 
to detect deception in this study (the overall accuracy rate 
was 55%), judges would have to be improbably accurate for 
process of elimination to significantly improve their accu-
racy. For example, a judge would have to guess correctly on 
the first six facial expressions to have a distinct advantage in 
figuring out the last two facial expressions. Nonetheless, if it 
were possible to improve accuracy by using process of elimi-
nation on the later clips, the fact that the order of all of the 
conditions was counterbalanced means that any advantage 
judges might have had would have affected all conditions of 
the study equally, rather than causing a confound.
Another alternative explanation is the possibility that the 
accuracy rates for close friends at Time 1 and the Re-do condi-
tion were so similar because the judges consciously or uncon-
sciously wanted to remain consistent with their earlier 
judgments about their friends’ facial expressions. While this 
explanation is possible, it seems unlikely for two reasons. First 
of all, the judges may not have remembered how they rated the 
eight clips of their friends 5 months earlier. Most importantly 
though, even if they had remembered their earlier ratings, it 
would have been difficult to make their second set of ratings 
consistent with their first set of ratings given that the facial 
expressions were shown in a different order in the Re-do con-
dition than they had been shown originally at Time 1.
People can deceive each other using different methods 
and it is possible that the results of this study would have 
been different if different methods had been used. In our 
study, senders were instructed to show the opposite emotion 
than the one they were feeling and this instruction was meant 
to represent a common form of deception in everyday life. 
People who do not want their friends or strangers to know 
their true (sad or angry) emotions might “put on a happy 
face” (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). 
People may also sometimes fake negative emotions to seem 
empathic or to gain attention (DePaulo, 2004). An alternative 
methodological option is to instruct senders simply to con-
ceal their true emotion, which might lead to a neutral, blank, 
or stone-faced expression. Given that a blank expression 
might be highly suspicious in certain social situations, we 
suspect that people are more likely to display false emotions 
than to appear utterly expressionless when trying to hide 
their true emotions. However, the issue of whether alterna-
tive methods of disguising one’s emotions might affect 
detectability is an empirical question, one that we hope will 
be addressed in future research.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Our study extended earlier research by Anderson et al. (2002) 
about the development of emotional deception detection 
accuracy in friendships over time in three important ways. 
First of all, by incorporating the Re-do condition, our study 
was able to show that improvement in the accuracy of close 
friends over time is due to some change in the senders within 
close friendships rather than the judges. What exactly the 
senders in close friendships are doing differently later into 
the friendship is still unknown and is an important question 
for future research. However, based on our data, we suspect 
it is related to the senders becoming less expressive later in 
the friendship in a way that gives only their close friends an 
advantage in detecting their deception and true emotions.
Second, the judges in our study had to detect nonverbal 
forms of deception, whereas the judges in the study by 
Anderson et al. (2002) made judgments about truthful and 
fabricated life stories. An alternative explanation of their 
results is that the close friends were more accurate because 
they had more information about their friends’ lives and 
could interpret the plausibility of their stories more knowl-
edgeably. However, in our study, information about friends’ 
lives could not have been responsible for the improved accu-
racy because judgments were based on facial expressions 
alone. Therefore, friends are more accurate than strangers 
even when the advantage of knowing more about the lives of 
friends than strangers is irrelevant.
Finally, our study is the first to find an indirect cue to 
deception that is unique to friendships: perceptions of expres-
sivity. Future research could explore whether there are other 
indirect cues to deception within the context of friendships or 
romantic relationships.
Although our study found that friends lost their accuracy 
advantage over strangers when their friends were trying to 
disguise unpleasant reactions to film clips, we suspect that 
motivated inaccuracy within friendships would be even 
greater if those unpleasant emotions were threatening to the 
friendship. Motivated inaccuracy is especially likely to occur 
when there is a real motivation and benefit to that inaccuracy 
(Anderson et al., 1999). Future research could look specifi-
cally at altruistic and relationship-maintaining lies longitudi-
nally. As a friendship develops over time, particularly a close 
friendship in which personal secrets are shared and friends 
depend on each other, the importance of maintaining that 
friendship may increase. Therefore, it is possible that accu-
racy for altruistic and relationship-maintaining lies will 
decrease over time as those lies become even more important 
to believe.
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Note
1. See Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991), Snedecor and Cochran 
(1967), and Winer (1971) for the use of ANOVA with dichoto-
mous dependent variables.
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